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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Brandon Yazzie was "already serving" a sentence in Judge Fuchs' case when
Judge McCleve sentenced him. Probation is explicitly defined as a sentence in Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-201(2) (Supp. 2007), which is located in the same chapter as the
consecutive sentencing statute. That specific provision prevails over any more general
language found in elsewhere in the Code, and establishes that a sentence a defendant is
"already serving" under section 76-3-401(1) (2003) includes a sentence of probation. In
addition, when the Legislature intends to specify that it is referring to a sentence that
involves incarceration rather than all possible sentences, it ordinarily uses qualifying
language. Because the Legislature referred to all sentences and did not limit the
consecutive sentencing statute to sentences of incarceration, sentences "the defendant is
already serving" under section 76-3-40 l(l)(b) includes sentences of probation.
Moreover, even if the language were limited to sentences of incarceration, Judge Fuchs

imposed jail time; therefore Yazzie was already serving a sentence regardless of whether
the consecutive sentencing statute is limited to sentences of incarceration.
Yazzie's sentence in Judge Fuchs' case did not cease to be a sentence when a
probation violation report was filed. The tolling provision of Utah Code Ann. § 77-181(11) (Supp. 2007) simply indicates that time that passes while a probation violation is
pending does not count toward total probation time if the defendant is found to have been
in violation. Even though the time is tolled, the defendant continues to be under a
sentence of probation pursuant to section 77-18-1. And, if the defendant is subsequently
found not to have violated probation, the time is not tolled. If the state were correct, a
judge imposing sentence in a subsequent case would have no way of knowing whether
the defendant was under sentence while a probation violation was pending.
Practical concerns also support the conclusion that the consecutive/concurrent
sentencing decision must be made at sentencing and not following probation violation.
This case illustrates those concerns since Judge McCleve did not have an updated
presentence report PSR and did not consider all of the necessary factors in deciding to
impose consecutive sentences following probation revocation. Although at sentencing
Judge McCleve did have a current PSR and conducted a full hearing, following probation
revocation she apparently imposed consecutive sentences based on her incorrect belief
that there was a presumption of consecutive sentences and the fact of the probation
violation.
Utah's rules and statutes require that the consecutive sentencing decision be made
at sentencing and not after probation revocation. The PSR recognized this and
2

recommended that Judge McCleve impose the prison sentences in her case consecutively
with each other but concurrently with the sentence in Judge Fuchs' case. Judge McCleve
considered the PSR and apparently followed its recommendation by ordering that the
sentences in her case run consecutively with each other. By increasing this sentence
following probation revocation to include an order that her case run consecutively with
that of Judge Fuchs, Judge McCleve violated Utah's statute and the protection against
double jeopardy. Moreover, at sentencing she imposed a legal sentence because the
judgment implicitly ordered that her sentence run concurrently with Judge Fuchs'
sentence and even if it did not, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 contemplates that a sentence
is legally imposed even if the judge does not include the consecutive/concurrent
sentencing order in the judgment.
ARGUMENT
UTAH STATUTES AND RULES REQUIRE THAT THE
CONSECUTIVE/CONCURRENT SENTENCING DECISION BE MADE
AT SENTENCING AND NOT FOLLOWING PROBATION VIOLATION.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 requires that the consecutive/concurrent sentencing
decision be made at sentencing regardless of whether a defendant is "already serving"
another sentence. Other statutes and rules support this requirement by helping to ensure
that the consecutive/concurrent sentencing decision is based on all relevant factors
following a full hearing, rather than primarily on the fact that the defendant failed at
probation. At sentencing, a trial court can impose sentence concurrently/consecutively
with any other sentence a defendant is serving, including a sentence of probation.

3

After Yazzie was adjudged guilty, Judge McCleve considered the
consecutive/concurrent determination at sentencing. R. 45-47. Because Yazzie was
"already serving" a sentence in Judge Fuchs' case, Judge McCleve had the authority to
decide at that time whether the sentence in her case was to run consecutively with the
sentence in Judge Fuch's case. Neither the fact that Yazzie was on probation nor the fact
that a probation violation report had been filed in the other case changed this requirement
since probation is a sentence being served by a defendant. In addition to the statutory
requirement that the determination be made at sentencing, practical considerations work
in favor of making the decision at sentencing. In this case where Judge McCleve did not
impose consecutive sentences at sentencing, she was precluded from doing so following
probation violation by Utah's statutes and double jeopardy concerns.
A. Although Yazzie was on probation in the other case, he was "already
serving" a sentence when Judge McCleve sentenced him.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1) requires a trial court to make the
consecutive/concurrent sentencing decision after the defendant "has been adjudged guilty
of more than one felony offense," to state the decision on the record, and "indicate [it] in
the order of judgment and commitment." Id. The statute allows a trial court to order a
sentence "to run concurrently or consecutively with any other sentences the defendant is
already serving." Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401(1 )(b). Because probation is a sentence, it
qualifies as a sentence "the defendant is already serving" for purposes of the consecutive
sentencing statute. See id.
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Probation is specifically defined as a sentence under Utah Code Ann. §76-3201(2). The state acknowledges in passing that this provision allows a trial court to
sentence a defendant to probation, but fails to acloiowledge that the statute also explicitly
states that probation is a sentence. Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201(2) states:
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person
convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or combination of
them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;

Id. (emphasis added). Pursuant to "well-settled principle[s] of statutory construction,"
this specific, explicit definition of probation as a sentence takes precedence over any
more general statutory language that the state relies on to support its claim that probation
is not a sentence. Emergency Physicians Integrated Care v. Salt Lake County, 2007 UT
72,1J19, 167 P.3d 1080 ("We acloiowledge the well-settled principle of statutory
construction that 'when two provisions address the same subject matter and one provision
is general while the other is specific, the specific provision controls.5") (citations
omitted).
Although this specific definition of probation as a sentence is found not only in the
same title as Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401, but also in the same chapter, the state relies on
statutes found in Title 77 to support its argument that probation is not a sentence a
defendant "is already serving" within the meaning of section 76-3-401. See Appellee Br.
at 12-13. This argument disregards not only the rules of statutory construction that
5

require that the specific provision prevail, but also the organization of Utah's Code and
the interrelation of statutes found within a specific chapter. See e.g. Utah Code Ann. §
76-3-201 (2) ("[wjithin the limits prescribed by this chapter . . ."). Because probation is
specifically included as a possible sentence in the same chapter and immediately
preceding the consecutive sentencing statute, it necessarily follows that probation is a
sentence the defendant "is already serving" under Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401(1).
Rather than focusing on the specific definition of probation as a sentence found in
76-3-201(2), the state relies primarily on a statute in the chapter of Title 77 pertaining to
"Pardons and Paroles." See Appellee Br. at 12-13. Although the state is correct that
section 77-27-1(10) (2003) states "[probation is an act of grace by the court suspending
imposition or execution of a convicted offender's sentence upon prescribed conditions,"
that language is general in nature and pertinent to the role of the Board of Pardons. See
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-1. Because the statute does not specifically define sentences
that a defendant can serve, its general language does not trump the specific language in
section 76-3-201 which clearly states that probation is a sentence under that chapter. See
Emergency Physicians Integrated Care, 2007 UT 72, ^ 19 (specific provision controls).
Moreover, the chapter of Title 77 discussing Pardons and Paroles later narrows the word
"sentence" by qualifying that the Board of Pardons has authority only over sentences
where the persons are "committed to serve [the sentence] at penal or correctional
facilities." Utah Code Ann. §77-27-5(l)(a) (Supp. 2007). In other words, when the
Legislature needed to specify the sentences over which the Board has authority, it

6

expressly included language demonstrating that the sentence was one of imprisonment.

Id
Including qualifying language when the statute refers to a sentence of
imprisonment rather than all possible sentences is consistent with other statutes and rules.
See e.g. Utah R. Crim. P. 27(a)(2), (d)(2), (f)(2) (referring to "a sentence that does not
include a term of incarceration in jail or prison"); Utah Code Ann. §77-20-10(1) (Supp.
2007) (including qualifying language to distinguish sentences that contain "a term of
imprisonment in jail or prison"); Utah R. Crim. P. 22(d) (including qualifying language to
distinguish sentences where "a jail or prison sentence is imposed"); Utah Code Ann. §7835a-302(4)(a) (2002) (including qualifying language to refer to a "sentence of
imprisonment"); Utah Code Ann. §77-15-3(1) (2003) (including qualifying language to
specify a "sentence of imprisonment"); Utah Code Ann. §76-3-208(1) (2003) (referring
to "[p]ersons sentenced to imprisonment"); Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201.l(5)(d) (2003)
(allowing court to "execute the original sentence of imprisonment"); Utah Code Ann.
§63-25a-410(l)(f) (2004) (exempting "any convicted offender serving a sentence of
imprisonment" from reparations); Utah Code Ann. §23-20-4(6) (2007) (requiring
"sentence of incarceration" under certain circumstances). Moreover, the
consecutive/concurrent sentencing statute contains another subsection that explicitly
defines "imprisoned" as meaning that a person has been "sentenced and committed to a
secure correctional facility ...." Utah Code Ann. 76-3-401(12). Hence, in the context of
section 76-3-401 and other statutes, the Legislature uses qualifying language when it
refers to sentences involving imprisonment. Since the Legislature did not include
7

qualifying language indicating that the consecutive sentencing decision applied only to
sentences of imprisonment the defendant was already serving, sentences a "defendant is
already serving" under Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401(1 )(b) are not limited to sentences
where the defendant is incarcerated.
Other provisions of the Utah Code and Rules further demonstrate that probation is
a sentence. For example, Utah R. Crim. P. 27(a)(2) recognizes that probation is a
sentence since it allows "[a] sentence of fine, imprisonment, or probation" to be stayed.
Id. Utah Code Ann. §20A-2-101.5(2)(a) (2007) recognizes probation as a sentence since
it allows a convicted felon's right to vote to be restored when "the felon is sentenced to
probation." Id,; see also e.g. Utah Code Ann. §41-6a-505 (2005) (referring to probation
as a possible sentence); Utah Code Ann. §41-6a-507(3) (2005) (probation recognized as a
sentence); Utah Code Ann. §77-36-5 (2003) (recognizing probation as a sentence).
The judgment entered by Judge McCleve at sentencing further shows that a trial
court can order prison sentences to run consecutively even though a defendant is placed
on probation. The judgment states that for the third degree felony convictions in Judge
McCleve's case, Yazzie was sentenced to serve "0 - 5 years prison on each count,
consecutive to each other, suspended all but 365 days jail" and placed on probation. R.
47. As section 76-3-401 and other statutes contemplate, Judge McCleve made the
consecutive/concurrent sentencing decision and ordered that the prison sentences in her
case be served consecutively even though she suspended those sentences and placed
Yazzie on probation.
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As this Court acknowledged in Velasquez v. Pratt, 443 P.2d 1020 (Utah 1968), a
person who is on probation, "is deemed to be actually serving the sentence imposed." Id
at 1021 (citing Baine v. Beckstead, 347 P.2d 554 (Utah 1959)). This is consistent with
Utah's statutory scheme, as outlined above and in Yazzie's opening brief, which
recognizes probation as a sentence. It is also consistent with Utah procedure, which
requires that sentence, which can be a sentence of fine, probation or imprisonment, be
imposed from two to forty-five days after verdict or plea. Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a).
Contrary to the state's argument, probation is a sentence and under section 76-3-401(1), it
can be a sentence "the defendant is already serving." IcL Accordingly, when Judge
McCleve sentenced Yazzie, he was already serving a sentence on the prior theft case.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401(1), Judge McCleve was required to make the
consecutive/concurrent sentencing decision when she sentenced Yazzie.
B. A Defendant is still serving a sentence even if he is charged with a probation
violation.
The state argues alternatively that even if a sentence of probation is a sentence, it
ceases to be sentence when a probation violation report is filed because of the tolling
provision of Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(11). This argument fails because (1) it is not
supported by the plain language of Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(11) or any other statute;
and (2) it is illogical and unworkable.
Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(11) requires that "[t]he running of the probation period
is tolled" when a probation violation report is filed or an order to show cause is issued
and "[a]ny time served by a probationer outside of confinement" after a probation
9

violation is charged does not count toward the total probation time "unless the
probationer is exonerated." Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(1 l)(a)(i), (b). But these
provisions say only that a defendant cannot count the time toward the total probation
time; they do not say that the defendant is not serving a sentence. In fact, were it not for
the sentence of probation, the trial court would not have authority to find that a defendant
violated probation.
Rather than establishing that probation ceases to be a sentence when a probation
violation report is filed, the tolling provisions clarify that a defendant under a sentence of
probation cannot count the time towards the total probation. Utah Code Ann. §77-181(1 l)(a))(i), (b). The tolling provision therefore requires a sentence of probation to be in
place and that the sentence continue while the probation violation is pending; in fact, the
probation violation procedure is part of a sentence of probation, and absent a sentence of
probation, there would be no basis for such a probation violation proceeding. Contrary to
the state's argument, nothing in section 77-18-1(11) suggests that probation ceases to be a
sentence when a probation violation report is filed or serves to undercut the explicit
provision of section 76-3-201(2) that probation is a sentence.
Moreover, the state's argument that probation ceases to be a sentence when a
probation violation report is filed contains obvious practical limitations. The state seems
to assume that any time a probation violation report is filed, the defendant will be found
in violation of probation and the sentence of probation will therefore cease to exist at the
time the probation violation report is filed. See Appellee Br. at 13-14. But in cases
where a defendant is found not to have been in violation, the defendant does receive
10

credit toward the probationary period for the time during which the probation violation
was pending. Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(11). Under the state's argument, a defendant
who was held on a probation violation charge and subsequently found not to have
violated probation would be serving a sentence the entire time whereas a defendant who
is found to have violated probation would cease to serve a sentence at the time the
probation violation report is filed. A judge who was imposing sentence in another case
while a probation violation was pending in an earlier case would have no way of
knowing, under the state's argument, whether the person was "already serving" a
sentence; this makes the state's argument unworkable.
Because the language of section 77-18-1(11) and other statutes as well as practical
considerations fail to support the state's novel claim that a sentence ceases to exist when
a probation violation report is filed, that claim fails.
C. Practical considerations further demonstrate that the state is incorrect that
probation is not a sentence for consecutive/concurrent sentencing purposes.
As the dissent in Anderson noted, "[t]he majority's definition of 'already serving'
may often lead to illogical results." State v. Anderson, 2007 UT App 68, ^ 24, 157 P.3d
809 (Davis, J., dissenting). Practical considerations in addition to the problems outlined
by the Anderson dissent and in Yazzie's opening brief further demonstrate that a sentence
of probation qualifies as a sentence a defendant is "already serving" under section 76-3401(l)(b). In fact, the judge overseeing a probation violation rarely, if ever, has an
updated PSR and does not conduct a full sentencing hearing, making it difficult to
comply with due process and section 76-3-401(1) in assessing whether to impose
11

consecutive sentences. Additionally, allowing the decision to be made following
probation revocation can result in consecutive sentences based on the fact of the
probation violation rather than the factors outlined in Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401(2). In
this case, where Judge McCleve did not impose her sentence consecutively with that of
Judge Fuchs at sentencing when she had the benefit of a current PSR and full input from
the parties, imposing a consecutive sentence more than a year later without benefit of an
updated report or a full sentencing hearing demonstrates that practical considerations also
favor making the determination at sentencing.
The Anderson dissent further recognized that the majority's decision was illogical
and impractical in part because a probationary sentence that included jail time would
trigger the consecutive sentencing statute whereas a probationary sentence without jail
time would not. Anderson, 2007 UT App 68, *|24 (Davis, J., dissenting). In other words,
under the Anderson majority's approach, a defendant who received jail as part of
probation would be "already serving" a sentence whereas a defendant who received
straight probation without jail would not be serving a sentence. See id. (Davis, J.,
dissenting). In this case where Yazzie was given credit for two years of jail and remained
in jail after sentencing pending completion of the CATS program, Yazzie was "already
serving" a sentence under the view of the Anderson majority regardless of whether
probation is considered a sentence. See docket in Judge Fuchs case at 8 in Addendum.
The majority's decision is also unworkable because it allows a judge to impose
consecutive sentences based almost entirely on the fact of a probation violation rather
than based on the factors set forth in section 76-3-401(2) after a full sentencing hearing.
12

While the second sentencing judge generally has a current PSR, holds a full sentencing
hearing that complies with due process, and considers all relevant sentencing factors, a
probation violation judge rarely has a current PSR or conducts a full sentencing hearing.
This is so because the probation violation judge usually executes the previously imposed
sentence without making a new sentencing decision.
This case highlights the inability of a probation violation judge to fully consider
all appropriate factors for determining whether to impose consecutive sentences. Judge
McCleve did not have an updated PSR report; instead, the file contains a PSR prepared
over a year earlier and there is no indication that McCleve reviewed that report prior to
imposing consecutive sentences at the probation violation hearing. R. 48, 82. The
hearing itself did not include a discussion of the factors relevant to the consecutive
sentencing decision. R. 82. Instead, the prosecutor argued that the judge "[mjight as
well run them consecutive. . . . The Board of Pardons is going to determine how many
years he is going to stay there regardless. . . ." R. 82:3. Although defense counsel
began to object, McCleve interrupted and imposed consecutive sentences because she
believed, incorrectly, that consecutive sentences were presumed. She stated, "[t]he
presumption is consecutive. So Fm going to go consecutive." R. 83:4. The record of the
probation violation hearing therefore shows that the judge did not comply with due
process, Rule 22(a), and section 76-3-401(2) by considering all relevant sentencing
factors, and instead imposed consecutive sentences based on a probation violation and the
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incorrect belief that the statute required her to presume that the sentences be served
consecutively.1
The unpublished decision in State v. Workman, 2007 UT App 199 (unpublished),
further demonstrates the impracticality of allowing the probation violation judge to make
the consecutive sentencing decision following revocation. Although the trial court made
the consecutive sentencing decision following probation revocation, the court of appeals
did not address the propriety of this procedure in Workman. Id. Workman therefore
does not provide support for the state's position. Workman does, however, show the
difficulties that occur in fairly determining the propriety of consecutive sentences when
the probation revocation judge makes the decision. In fact, after imposing consecutive
sentences, the probation violation judge in Workman retained jurisdiction '"to make a
change as to the consecutive sentence if there is a recommendation5" from the other
sentencing court. Id. The probation violation judge apparently recognized that the judge
who would be sentencing Workman on the new case would be in a better position to
assess the consecutive sentencing decision as part of a complete sentencing proceeding.
Accordingly, the probation violation judge suggested that he might be willing to defer to
the decision of the other court. Rather than suggesting that the state's position provides

Judge McCleve was incorrect in presuming that the sentences were to run
consecutively. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(3) creates such a presumption only if the
defendant is imprisoned or on parole when he commits the new offense. Since Yazzie
was not in prison nor on parole when he committed the crimes in Judge McCleve's case,
the presumption of subsection (3) did not apply. Instead, Judge McCleve was required to
make the decision based on the factors set forth in section 76-3-401(2) without presuming
either possibility.
14

the better procedure, Workman highlights a problem in allowing the probation violation
judge to make the consecutive sentencing decision. Id.
The majority's decision in Anderson further impacts on the finality of judgments,
the timing for filing an appeal, and Utah criminal procedure in general. Although a
judgment is considered final when the judgment is entered, allowing a consecutive
sentencing determination to be made following probation violation injects a lack of
finality. While historically and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(12), trial courts
have been limited to revoking probation and executing the original sentence, the
majority's new rule allows courts to impose an additional and harsher sentence following
probation revocation. And, a defendant is not informed of the actual sentence until after
probation revocation, thereby undermining a defendant's ability to rely on the finality of
a judgment entered at sentencing and interfering with the orderly appeal of a sentence a
defendant believes is too harsh. The imposition of consecutive sentences following
probation violation was contrary not only to the language of section 76-3-401(1) but also
violated established procedure which consistently recognizes that final judgment is
entered shortly after a criminal defendant is adjudged guilty.
D. Utah law authorizes the trial court to make the consecutive/concurrent
sentencing decision at sentencing and not after probation violation.
As previously outlined, Utah's statutes and rules contemplate that a criminal
sentence, including the consecutive sentencing decision, be stated on the record and
entered in the judgment and commitment, ordinarily between two and forty-five days
after plea or verdict. See e,g. Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401(1). Utah's statutes and rules
15

work together to ensure that trial courts have the tools necessary to make an informed
sentencing decision at that time, and also to ensure that a final judgment allowing a
timely appeal is in place shortly after verdict or plea, regardless of whether the defendant
is placed on probation. As has been shown, requiring that the consecutive/concurrent
sentencing decision be made at sentencing and entered in the judgment is consistent with
the plain language of Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401, other statutes, and practical
considerations; it is also consistent with the requirements of Utah R. Crim. P. 22 and is
not undermined by the clarification provision of Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401(4).
Utah R. Crim. P. 22 further demonstrates that section 76-3-401(1) requires that the
consecutive/concurrent sentencing decision be made at sentencing and not following
probation violation. Rule 22(a) uses language similar to that in section 76-3-401(1) when
it requires that sentencing occur shortly after a person is adjudged guilty. Rule 22(a) is
also consistent with Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401(1) in requiring that the prosecutor and
defendant be allowed to present evidence relevant to sentencing - and the
consecutive/concurrent sentencing decision - at the sentencing hearing held shortly after
a person is adjudged guilty. Rule 22(c) is likewise consistent with section 76-3-401(1) in
indicating that sentence is imposed and judgment and commitment is entered shortly after
a person is adjudged guilty, and not following probation violation. Because section 76-3401(1) requires that the consecutive sentencing decision be made at sentencing and
indicated in the order of judgment and commitment, and Rule 22 works hand in hand
with this statute to outline the procedure for a fair sentencing, Rule 22 further
demonstrates that the consecutive sentencing decision must be made at sentencing.
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The provision in section 76-3-401 that allows the Board of Pardons to "request
clarification from the [trial] court" if the judgment does not contain a
consecutive/concurrent sentencing order does not change the requirement that the
consecutive/concurrent sentencing decision be made at sentencing and not following
probation violation. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4). Although section 76-3-401(4) does
allow the Board to ask for clarification if the judgment and commitment does not contain
a consecutive/concurrent sentencing order, it does not authorize the trial court to actually
make the decision for the first time after judgment has been entered and jurisdiction has
been transferred to the Board of Pardons. Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401(4) states:
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences
are to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall
request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, the court shall
enter a clarified order of commitment stating whether the sentences are to run
consecutively or concurrently.
Id. While this section was meant to clarify that the Board need not presume that
sentences are to run concurrently if the judgment does not explicitly state otherwise (see
former Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401), it simply affects the procedure that can be utilized by
the Board for clarification if the judgment is not clear and does not create jurisdiction for
further proceedings in the trial court.
Additionally, if the trial court were to consider the question of consecutive
sentences for the first time upon receipt of a letter from the Board, the court would be
required to hold a hearing and consider all of the factors outlined in Utah Code Ann. §763-401(2) in order to comply with statutory, rule and due process requirements. Nothing
in this section or elsewhere in the Code grants the trial court jurisdiction to consider
17

sentencing matters in a criminal case after judgment has been entered, the defendant has
been committed to prison, and jurisdiction has been transferred to the Board of Pardons.
When section 76-3-401 is read as a whole, it is evident that subsection (4) is meant to do
nothing more than do away with the presumption of concurrent sentences and instead
allow the Board to receive clarification regarding a previously imposed sentence.
Moreover, subsection (4) was not implicated in this case because the Board did not
request clarification of the sentence and the judgment Judge McCleve entered did not
require clarification. Judge McCleve's imposition of consecutive sentences only for the
two felony counts in her case, but not with the sentence in Judge Fuchs' case, shows that
Judge McCleve made the consecutive/concurrent sentencing decision at sentencing and
did not require that Judge Fuchs' sentence be served consecutively. In fact, the PSR
referred to Judge Fuchs' case and recommended that Judge McCleve run the prison
sentences in her case consecutively with each other but concurrently with the sentence in
Judge Fuchs' case. R. 48: 2, 6. That is what Judge McCleve did at sentencing; by
deciding the issue at sentencing and issuing an order that did not require that her sentence
run consecutively with Judge Fuchs' sentence, Judge McCleve followed the PSR
recommendation and entered a judgment that was sufficiently clear so as to require that
her sentences run concurrently with those in Judge Fuchs' case.
The clarity of Judge McCleve's judgment on the consecutive sentencing issue is
buttressed not only by the PSR recommendation, but also by a review of section
76-3-401(1). The directive of subsection (1) that a [a] court shall determine, if a
defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one felony offense, whether to impose
18

concurrent or consecutive sentences . . . [and] state on the record and [ ] indicate in the
order of judgment and commitment" applies to both scenarios for consecutive sentencing
decisions that were before Judge McCleve. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401. The statute
contains no language requiring that the decision for sentences in the same case must be
made at sentencing while the decision regarding other cases may be made later. In fact,
allowing a trial court to bifurcate the decision as was ultimately done in this case unduly
complicates sentencing, leads to decisions imposing consecutive sentences without
considering all relevant factors, and deprives a defendant of expectation of finality in a
sentence. Judge McCleve had already made the consecutive/concurrent sentencing
decision and followed the PSR recommendation by not imposing her sentence
consecutively to that of Judge Fuchs. She did not have the authority to later reconsider
the decision and impose consecutive sentences.
E. Because section 76-3-401(1) requires that the consecutive sentencing decision
be made at sentencing and the trial court made that determination without
imposing consecutive sentences, later imposition of consecutive sentences violates
the protection against double jeopardy
Although double jeopardy is not implicated under Utah's statutory scheme when a
trial court revokes probation and executes a previously imposed sentence, it is violated
when a trial court imposes a harsher sentence following probation revocation. In other
words, requiring Yazzie to serve his previously imposed sentence of incarceration did not
violate double jeopardy, but imposing a harsher sentence by requiring him to serve his
sentences consecutively did violate that protection since a less severe sentence had
previously been imposed. Under a statutory system such as Utah's which authorizes a
19

court to impose sentence before probation, but authorizes only the execution of that
sentence following probation revocation, a double jeopardy violation occurs when a trial
judge increases a sentence to include a consecutive requirement after revoking probation.
As previously outlined, Utah's statutory scheme requires sentencing shortly after a
person is adjudged guilty, and requires that the consecutive/concurrent sentencing
decision be made at that time. See inter alia Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1); Utah R.
Crim. P. 22(a). Once sentence is imposed, Utah's statutory scheme authorizes only the
execution of sentence and does not authorize the imposition of a harsher sentence. See
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12). Under a different statutory scheme that authorized the
imposition of a harsher sentence following probation violation, the double jeopardy
concerns might not surface. But in Utah, where final sentence is entered shortly after the
defendant is adjudged guilty and before probation and the statute contemplates that a
consecutive/concurrent sentencing decision will be included in that final sentence,
imposing a consecutive sentence for the first time following probation violation results in
a harsher sentence in violation of double jeopardy.
As outlined in Appellant's brief at 24-26, double jeopardy is violated when a
sentence is increased after a defendant begins to serve it. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163,
173 (1873). A sentence is harsher or increased if additional terms or conditions are
imposed. See State v. Sorenson, 639 P.2d 179, 181 (Utah 1981). States like Utah that
limit a trial court to executing a previously imposed sentence following probation
violation, have concluded that the "subsequent imposition of new conditions or terms to a
sentence" after probation violation violates the double jeopardy protection. Tran v. State,
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965 So.2d 226, 229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (citation omitted); Commonwealth v.
Tomlin, 336 A.2d 407, 408-09 (Pa. Super. 1975); Nelson v. State, 617 P.2d 502, 504
(Alaska 1981).
A consecutive sentencing order following probation violation is a new term that
increases the sentence. The fact that the Board of Pardons will decide actual release date
does not detract from the fact that a trial court's order of consecutive sentences
constitutes a harsher sentence than a concurrent sentencing order. Indeed, trial courts
would not be required to make a decision between consecutive and concurrent sentences
if a consecutive sentence did not result in a harsher sentence. And, the Utah Sentence
and Release Guidelines, Appx. D in Utah Ct. R. Ann. at 1610 (2007), recommend that an
inmate serve significantly more time when a trial court order that the sentence be served
consecutively with other sentences.
As the court explained in Tomlin, increasing a sentence following probation
violation violates double jeopardy because the judge had previously imposed a lighter
sentence for the crime. Tomlin, 336 A.2d at 409. The court explained further that
allowing imposition of an increased sentence following probation violation was not
reasonable nor fair since the court had previously fully considered the applicable
evidence and "on that basis has assessed a proper sentence.5' Id. It rejected the
imposition of a harsher sentence following probation revocation, stating in part, "[t]he
infirmity of increasing a previously imposed sentence is that the trial judge has evaluated
the evidence and on that basis has assessed a proper sentence. Because the trial court
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pronounced sentence upon the appellant, the court was bounds by the terms of the
original sentence.55 Id.
The court in Tran reached a similar conclusion, reasoning that sentence had
previously been imposed under Florida's statutory scheme. Tran, 965 So.2d at 229. It
pointed out that "'[ojnce a sentence has been imposed and the person begins to serve the
sentence, that sentence may not be increased without running afoul of double jeopardy
principles.55 Ld. (citation omitted). Because the defendant had begun serving his sentence
when the judge decided to impose treatment for a duration of five years, the court held
that the treatment condition part of the sentence violated double jeopardy. Id.
The cases cited by the state at 28-32 do not provide guidance since for the most
part they do not involve statutory schemes that require that the consecutive sentencing
decision be made at sentencing nor circumstances where the judge has already decided
the consecutive/concurrent sentencing issue. See, e.g., United States v. OlivaresMartines, 767 F.2d 1135, 1138 (5th Cir. 1985) (indicating that double jeopardy was not
violated because "Congress has provided a court with the power to modify a sentence in
light of changed circumstances.55); State v. Holcomb, 360 S.E.2d 232, 234, 238-39
(W.Va. 1987) (indicating that double jeopardy was not violated where the trial court had
suspended the imposition of sentence); State v. Ryerson, 570 A.2d 709, 711 (Conn. Ct.
App. 1990) (stating "the probation revocation sentencing court. . . has the statutory
authority to impose [consecutive sentences]55); People v. Preuss, 920 P.2d 859, 861 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1995) (stating that following probation violation, the "trial court was authorized
to impose any sentence . . . that originally could have been imposed .. . 55 ). Because the
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statutory authority allowed a trial court to make the consecutive sentencing decision
following probation violation, the courts concluded that imposition of consecutive
sentences following probation revocation did not violate double jeopardy. By contrast,
because Utah's statutory scheme requires that the consecutive sentencing decision be
made at sentencing, increasing the sentence following probation revocation to require that
it be served consecutively violates the protections against double jeopardy.
In the present case, Yazzie began serving his sentence when Judge McCleve
sentenced him on April 25, 2005. R. 46-47. In fact, he was required to serve 365 days in
jail, with the two consecutive prison terms suspended. R. 47. Judge McCleve considered
the consecutive/concurrent sentencing issue and followed the recommendations of the
PSR (R. 48:2, 6); she expressly required that the two prison sentences in her case be
served consecutively even though she placed Yazzie on probation, but did not require that
the sentence in her case be served consecutively with the sentence in Judge Fuchs' case.
R. 47. Because Judge McCleve did not sentence Yazzie to consecutive sentences at the
time she was statutorily authorized to do so, she was precluded from later increasing the
sentence to include a consecutive sentencing order. The order imposing consecutive
sentences following probation revocation increased Yazzie's sentence in violation of the
protection against double jeopardy.
F. Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) does not allow a trial court to impose a consecutive
sentencing order for the first time following probation revocation.
The state's claim that Judge McCleve's sentence was illegal fails because, as
previously outlined, Judge McCleve considered the issue at sentencing and implicitly
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ordered that her case be served concurrently with that of Judge Fuchs, and also because
the failure to explicitly state the consecutive/concurrent decision in the judgment does not
result in an illegal sentence.
Although section 76-3-401 requires the trial court to make the
consecutive/concurrent sentencing decision at sentencing and include that decision in the
judgment, it also recognizes that a trial court might on occasion fail to include that
determination in the judgment. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1) & (4). By expressly
indicating that the Board of Pardons can ask for clarification if a judgment does not
contain a concurrent/consecutive sentencing determination, the Legislature also implicitly
indicated that the failure to include the designation does not result in an illegal sentence.
Indeed, if the state were correct that a judgment without a concurrent/consecutive
designation is illegal, a significant number of inmates who are currently serving
sentences that do not contain such a designation would be serving illegal sentences.
Moreover, as previously outlined, in this case Judge McCleve actually reached the
consecutive/concurrent sentencing determination at sentencing. She imposed the
sentences in her own case consecutively but followed the PSR and did not issue such an
order regarding the sentence in Judge Fuch's case. Under these facts, it is implicit in
Judge McCleve's original judgment that she was not imposing her sentence consecutively
with that in Judge Fuchs5 case.
2

Yazzie claimed in his opening brief that even if the issue was not preserved, Judge
McCleve's imposition of consecutive sentences following probation violation was an
illegal sentence and could be reviewed pursuant to Utah R. Grim. P. 22(e). Yazzie did
not claim that the initial sentencing imposed by Judge McCleve was illegal.
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The state's argument that Judge McCleve's sentence was illegal is not supported
by Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 or the facts of the case. Additionally, it is not a practical
argument since the logical consequence of the argument would be that many inmates are
serving illegal sentences. Because the sentence Judge McCleve imposed at sentencing
was not illegal, the state's Rule 22(e) argument fails.
CONCLUSION
Appellant/Defendant Brandon Yazzie respectfully requests that this Court vacate
the consecutive sentencing order.
SUBMITTED this J_y_ day of February, 2008.

JOAN C. WATT
PATRICK CORUM
Attorneys for Petitioner
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ADDENDUM

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH vs

BRANDON DOMINIC YAZZI

CASE NUMBER 021910707 State Felony

CHARGES
Charge 1 - 76-5-404 - FORCIBLE SEX ABUSE 1st Degree Felony
(amended) to 2nd Degree Felony
Plea. January 27, 2 00 3 Guilty
Disposition January 27, 2003 Guilty
Charge 2 - 76-5-4 04 - FORCIBLE SEX ABUSE 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: January 27, 2003 Guilty
Disposition: January 27, 2003 Guilty

CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
RANDALL SKANCHY
PARTIES
Plaintiff - STATE OF UTAH
Defendant - BRANDON DOMINIC YAZZI
Represented by: KAREN J STAM
Also Known As - BRANDON DOMINIC YAZZIE
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Defendant Name: BRANDON DOMINIC YAZZI
Offense tracking number: 13643184
Date of Birth: June 29, 1984
Jail Booking Number:
Law Enforcement Agency: SALT LAKE POLICE
LEA Case Number: 02-156295
Prosecuting Agency. SALT LAKE COUNTY
Agency Case Number 02016011
Sheriff Office Number: 265436
Violation Date: August 25, 2002 WEST TEMPLE & MARKET STREET
ACCOUNT SUMMARY

CASE NOTE
dao 02016011
PROCEEDINGS
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08-2 9-02 Judge DENNIS M FUCHS assigned.
08-29-02 Note: CASE FILED BY DET CATHY SCHONEY OF SLC DEF IS IN JAIL
WARRANT FAX TO THE JAIL
08-29-02 Case filed
08-29-02 Filed: Information
08-30-02 Note: Bail remain $100,007
08-3 0-02 INITIAL APPEARANCE scheduled on September 03, 20 02 at 09:30 AM
in Arraignment Jail with Judge ARRAIGNMENT.
09-03-02 Note: FILED: Affidavit of Indigency - Judge Bohlmg signed and
appointed LDA to represent defendant m this case.
09-03-02 Minute Entry - Minutes for Appointment of Counsel
JudgeWILLIAM B. BOHLING
PRESENT
Clerk:
melbar
Prosecutor: CHRISTENSEN, VIRGINIA
Defendant
Video
Tape Number:

10-23-04

ARRAIGNMENT
The Information is read.
Advised of rights and penalties.
The defendant is advised of right to counsel.
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
Court finds the defendant indigent and appoints Legal Defender
Office to represent the defendant.
Appointed Counsel:
Name: Legal Defender Office
City:
Phone:
Instructions to the defendant:

1. You are to immediately contact and consult with appointed
counsel.
2. You are to cooperate with the appointed counsel m
of this case.

the defense

3. You are to keep appointed counsel advised at all times of an
address and a telephone number where you can be reached.
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4 Attorney's fees for services of counsel may be assessed at the
time of sentence
ROLL CALL is scheduled
Date 09/10/2002
Time 02 00 p m
Location To Be Determined
Third District Court
450 South State
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Before Judge SANDRA PEULER
09-04-02 ROLL CALL scheduled on September 10, 2002 at 02 00 PM m To Be
Determined with Judge PEULER
09-05-02 Note Bail remain $100,007
09-06-02 Filed Appearance of counsel
09-06-02 Filed Formal request for discovery pursuant to rule 16 of the
rules of criminal procedure
09-10-02 Filed AMENDED INFORMATION
09-10-02 Minute Entry - Minutes for Roll Call
Judge
SANDRA PEULER
PRESENT
Clerk
kathyg
Prosecutor MICKLOS, ANGELA F
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s) STAM, KAREN S
Video
Tape Number

1

Tape Count

3 02

HEARING
Roll call continued to October 1, 2 0 02 at 2 pm with Judge Noel
ROLL CALL
Date 10/01/2002
Time 02 00 p m
Location To Be Determined
Third District Court
450 South State
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Before Judge FRANK G NOEL
09-11-02 ROLL CALL scheduled on October 01, 2002 at 02 00 PM m To Be
Determined with Judge NOEL
09-12-02 Charge 76-5-402 Sev Fl was amended to 76-5-404 Sev F2
10-01-02 Minute Entry - Minutes for Roll Call
Judge
FRANK G NOEL
PRESENT
Clerk
micheldb
Prosecutor MURPHY, J KEVIN
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Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): STAM, KAREN S.
Video
Tape Number:

10/1/02

Tape Count: off record

HEARING
ATD requests a continuance of the roll call.
ROLL CALL.
Date: 10/29/2002
Time: 02:00 p.m.
Location: To Be Determined
Third District Court
450 South State
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Before Judge: JOSEPH C. FRATTO
10-02-02 ROLL CALL scheduled on October 29, 2002 at 02:00 PM in To Be
Determined with Judge FRATTO.
10-29-02 Minute Entry - Minutes for Roll Call
Judge:
JOSEPH C. FRATTO
PRESENT

Clerk:
terryb
Prosecutor: DANE NOLAN
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): KAREN S. STAM
Video
Tape Number:

video

Tape Count: 3.52

HEARING
Roll call continued to 11/12.
ROLL CALL.
Date: 11/12/2002
Time: 02:00 p.m.
Location: To Be Determined
Third District Court
450 South State
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Before Judge: RANDALL SKANCHY
11-01-02 ROLL CALL scheduled on November 12, 2 0 02 at 02:00 PM in To Be
Determined with Judge SKANCHY.
11-12-02 Minute Entry - Minutes for Roll Call
Judge:
RANDALL SKANCHY
PRESENT
Clerk:
chandeei
Prosecutor: MICKLOS, ANGELA F
Defendant
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Defendant's Attorney(s): STAM, KAREN S.
Video
Tape Count: OFF
HEARING
Court Orders case set for a Preliminary Hearing
PRELIMINARY HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 12/10/2002
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: Third Floor - S32
Before Judge: REESE, ROBIN W.
11-12-02 Preliminary Hearing scheduled on December 10, 2002 at 09:00 AM
in Third Floor - S32 with Judge REESE.
12-10-02 Preliminary Hearing scheduled on December 24, 2002 at 09:00 AM
in Fourth Floor - S41 with Judge MCCLEVE.
12-10-02 Note: ANGELA MICKLOS CALLED TO RESET PRELIM ON 12/24/02 2PM TO
12/24/02 9AM. KAREN STAM STIPULATED. CLERK ORDERED COURT
REPORTER.
12-10-02 Minute Entry - Minutes for Preliminary Hearing
Judge:
ROBIN W. REESE
PRESENT
Clerk:
bethkl
Prosecutor: MICKLOS, ANGELA F
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): STAM, KAREN S.
Video
Tape Number:

12/10/02

Tape Count: 11.22

HEARING
UPON DEFENSE MOTION C/O CASE CONT, MOTION TO RELEASE DENIED DEFT
TO CONTACT PTS
12-20-02 Filed: Notice of Expert Witness
12-24-02 Preliminary Hearing scheduled on January 14, 2003 at 09:00 AM
in Third Floor - W3 8 with Judge MAUGHAN.
12-24-02 Minute Entry - Minutes for Preliminary Hearing
Judge:
SHEILA K. MCCLEVE
PRESENT
Clerk:
lauraj
Reporter: YOUNG, BRAD
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): COLLINS FOR MICKLOS
CAT/CIC
Tape Number:

12/24/02
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HEARING
COUNSELS STIPULATED TO CONTINUE PRELIM TO 1/14/2003 AT 9AM BEFORE
JUDGE MAUGHAN
01 14-03 Note Case Bound Over
01-14-03 ARRAIGNMENT scheduled on January 27, 2003 at 08 30 AM m Fourth
Floor - W4 5 with Judge FUCHS
01 14-03 Minute Entry - Minutes for INCOURT NOTE
Judge
PAUL G MAUGHAN
PRESENT
Clerk
cheril
Reporter GREEN, TEENA
Prosecutor MICKLOS, ANGELA F
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s) STAM, KAREN S
Video
Tape Number

Video

Tape Count

10 4 0

Defense counsel appeared advising the court that the deft will
waive his right to a preliminary hearing at this time, based on the
state going to speak with the Park Commitee regarding amending the
charge
All conditions of the waiver read into record
CASE BOUNDOVER
Defendant waived preliminary hearing, State consenting thereto
This case is bound over
An Arraignment hearing has been set on
1/27/03 at 8 30 AM m courtroom W45 before Judge DENNIS M FUCHS
01-14-03 Note INCOURT NOTE minutes modified
01-27-03 Charge 1 amended
01-27-03 Charge 1 Disposition is Guilty
01-27-03 Minute Entry Judge
DENNIS M FUCHS
PRESENT
Clerk
wendypg
Prosecutor STOTT, ROBERT L
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s) STAM, KAREN S
Video
Tape Number

VIDEO

Tape Count

10 13

ARRAIGNMENT
The Infoimation is read
Defendant is arraigned
Presentence Investigation ordered
The Judge orders Adult Probation & Parole to prepare the repoit
Defendant transported - entered a plea and signed affidavit
State
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enters a 2nd amended information - sworn. Court orders AP&P to
conduct a pshycho-sexual evaluation on defendant.
Court sets
this over for sentencing on the following date:
SENTENCING is scheduled.
Date: 03/24/2003
Time: 08:30 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - W45
Third District Court
450 South State
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: DENNIS M. FUCHS
01-27-03 SENTENCING scheduled on March 24, 2003 at 08:30 AM in Fourth
Floor - W45 with Judge FUCHS.
01-27-03 Filed order: Second Amended Information
Judge DENNIS M FUCHS
Signed January 27, 2003
01-27-03 Filed order: Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea
and Certificate of Counsel
Judge DENNIS M FUCHS
Signed January 27, 2003
03-14-03 Filed: Memo AP&P - Defendant was evaluated.
03-21-03 Note: Received Presentence Investigation Report
03-24-03 Tracking started for Probation. Review date Mar 24, 2006.
03-24-03 Minute Entry - Minutes for SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITME
Judge:
DENNIS M. FUCHS
PRESENT
Clerk:
chandeei
Prosecutor: BURMESTER, BYRON F
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): STAM, KAREN S.
Video
Tape Count: 9:50
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of FORCIBLE SEX ABUSE a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
Based on the defendant's conviction of FORCIBLE SEX ABUSE a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
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Court Orders prison commitments to run consecutive with each other

Credit is granted for 2 year(s) previously served
SENTENCE JAIL RELEASE TIME NOTE
Upon successful completion of the CATS program, the Court may
consider an early release
SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$10000.00
$9250 00
$344.59
$750.00

Charge # 2

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$10000.00
$9250 00
$344 5 9
$750 00

Total Fine
Total Suspended
Total Surcharge
Total Principal Due

$20000.00
$18500.00
$689.18
$1500.00
Plus Interest
SENTENCE FINE PAYMENT NOTE
Fine to be paid through AP&P
SENTENCE TRUST
The defendant is to pay the following:
Attorney Fees:
Amount: $250.00 Plus Interest
Pay m behalf of: LDA
The amount of Attorney Fees
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s)
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole
Defendant is to pay a fine of 1500 00 which includes the surcharge.
Interest may increase the final amount due
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult
Probation & Parole.
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any
Law Enforcement Officer.
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Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or

illegal drugs.
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law
Enforcement Officer
Participate m and complete any educational, and/or vocational
training as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and
Parole
Violate no laws
Enter, participate m , and complete any program, counseling, or
treatment as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and
Parole.
Pay restitution as determined by Probation Officer.
Participate m mental health counseling.
Submit to drug testing.
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise
distributed illegally.
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages.
Court ordered no contact with victim.
The defendant to enter into and complete the Cognitive
Restructuring classes approved by the Court or Probation Officer.
Report regularly
Successfully complete the CATS program and aftercare
Complete a Sex Offender program
03-24-03 Note: Faxed copy of minutes from 3/24/03 to jail
03-27-03 Judgment #1 Entered
Creditor: LDA
Debtor:
BRANDON DOMINIC YAZZI
250.00 Attorneys Fees
250.00 Judgment Grand Total
03-27-03 Filed judgment: Criminal Sentence @J
Judge DENNIS M FUCHS
Signed March 24, 2003
02-24-04 Filed order: Order to Enter and Complete CATS Program in Jail
Judge DENNIS M FUCHS
Signed February 24, 2 0 04
02-24-04 Note: ORDER FAXED TO THE JAIL
08-18-04 Filed: Defendant sent and Letter and Order for a Review.
08-19-04 REVIEW HEARING scheduled on August 30, 2004 at 08:30 AM m
Fourth Floor - W45 with Judge FUCHS.
08-19-04 Note: RE: letter from defendant - court sets this over for a
Review. DMF/wpg
08-3 0-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for Law and Motion
Judge:
DENNIS M. FUCHS
PRESENT
Clerk:
wendypg
Prosecutor: POSTMA, MICHAEL E
Defendant not present
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HEARING
Defendant not brought into court. Counsel - Karen Stam - not
present. Court continues to the following date:
REVIEW HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 09/13/2004
Time: 08-30 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - W45
Third District Court
450 South State
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: DENNIS M. FUCHS
08-3 0-04 REVIEW HEARING scheduled on September 13, 2 0 04 at 08:30 AM in
Fourth Floor - W4 5 with Judge FUCHS.
08-30-04 Note Counsel Notified.
09-13-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for Review Hearing
Judge:
DENNIS M. FUCHS
PRESENT
Clerkwendypg
Prosecutor: PARKER, PAUL
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): STAM, KAREN S.
Video
Tape Number:

CD#2

Tape Count: 9-33-40

HEARING
Defendant transported for a review. Has not been able to get into
CATS. Counsel requests defendant be allowed to enter an inpatient
treatment program - Serenity, once a bed becomes available.
Court will grant once funding is in place and an order prepared by
counsel. All probation conditions to remain.
11-09-04 Filed order: Order of Release and Transportation to Serenity
House
Judge DENNIS M FUCHS
Signed November 09, 2 0 04
11-09-04 Note: ORDER FAXED TO JAIL
02-01-05 Filed: AP&P progress/violation report - Location of defendant
unknown. Request a bench warrant.
02-01-05 Filed: Affidavit m Support of Order to Show Cause
02-03-05 Filed order: AP&P p/v report - Court orders a $50,000 bench
warrant.
Judge DENNIS M FUCHS
Signed February 03, 2005

Printed: 02/12/08 11 43.47
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02-03-05 Filed order. Order to Show Cause
Judge DENNIS M FUCHS
Signed February 03, 2005
02-03-05 Tracking ended for Probation.

02-03-05 Notice - WARRANT for Case 021910707 ID 6186914
02-03-05 Warrant ordered on: February 03, 2005 Warrant Num: 981141918
Bail Allowed
Bail amount:
50000.00
02-03-05 Warrant issued on: February 03, 2005 Warrant Num: 981141918
Bail Allowed
Bail amount:
50000.00
Judge: DENNIS M FUCHS
Issue reason: Failure to Comply with Probation
02-14-05 Warrant recalled on: February 14, 2005 Warrant num: 981141918
Recall reason: Warrant recalled because defendant was
booked.
02-14-05 Note: Case referred to Judge Fuchs - Deft booked.
02-14-05 BENCH WARRANT HRG scheduled on February 16, 2005 at 08:30 AM in
Fourth Floor - W45 with Judge FUCHS.
02-16-05 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE scheduled on March 14, 2005 at 08:30 AM in
Fourth Floor - W45 with Judge FUCHS.
02-16-05 Minute Entry - Minutes for Bench Warrant Hrg
Judge:
DENNIS M FUCHS
PRESENT
Clerk:
autumnc
Defendant
Video
Tape Number:

CD#12

Tape Count: 8-47

HEARING
Defendant transported for a Bench Warrant Hearing. Court sets
this over for an Order to Show Cause for he following date:
Counsel Notified: (K. Stam)
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE is scheduled.
Date: 03/14/2005
Time: 08:30 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - W45
Third District Court
450 South State
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: DENNIS M FUCHS
03-08-05 Filed: AP&P progress/violation report - Defendant in violation
of probation. Request an OSC.
03-08-05 Filed: Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause
03-09-05 Filed order: Order to Show Cause
Judge DENNIS M FUCHS
Signed March 09, 2005
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03-14-05 Minute Entry - Minutes for Order to Show Cause
Judge:
DENNIS M FUCHS
PRESENT
Clerk:
wendypg
Prosecutor: KNELL, BRADLEY J

Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): STAM, KAREN J
Agency: Adult Probation & Parole
Video
Tape Number:

CD#12

Tape Count: 9-3 0

HEARING
Defendant transported for an Order to Show Cause. Admits
allegation. Defendant has a sentencing date on another case
pending. Court contines for a Disposition on the following date:
DISPOSITION is scheduled.
Date: 04/04/2005
Time: 08:30 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - W45
Third District Court
450 South State
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: DENNIS M FUCHS
03-14-05 DISPOSITION scheduled on April 04, 2005 at 08:30 AM in Fourth
Floor - W4 5 with Judge FUCHS.
03-15-05 Notice - WARRANT for Case 021910707 ID 6224096
03-15-05 Warrant ordered on: March 15, 2005 Warrant Num: 981144224 No
Bail
03-15-05 Warrant issued on: March 15, 2005 Warrant Num: 981144224 No
Bail
Judge: DENNIS M FUCHS
Issue reason: Defendant to be held without bail pending
sentencing.
03-30-05 Warrant recalled on: March 30, 2005 Warrant num: 981144224
Recall reason: Warrant recalled defendant booked
03-30-05 Note: Defendant booked on NO BAIL warrant. Referred to Judge
Fuchs.
04-04-05 DISPOSITION scheduled on April 25, 2005 at 08:30 AM in Fourth
Floor - W4 5 with Judge FUCHS.
04-04-05 Minute Entry - Minutes for DISPOSITION
Judge:
DENNIS M FUCHS
PRESENT
Clerk:
wendypg
Prosecutor: JOHNSON, JOHN K
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): STAM, KAREN J
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Page 12

CASE NUMBER 021910707 State Felony

Video
Tape Number:

CD#14

Tape Count: 9-26

HEARING
Defendant transported for a Disposition.

Counsel moves to

continue - waiting to resolve case before Judge Atherton.
DISPOSITION.
Date: 04/25/2005
Time: 08:30 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - W45
Third District Court
450 South State
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: DENNIS M FUCHS
04-25-05 Minute Entry - Post Sentencing
Judge:
DENNIS M FUCHS
PRESENT
Clerk:
wendypg
Prosecutor: UPDEGROVE, KENNETH R
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): STAM, KAREN J
Agency: Adult Probation & Parole
Video
Tape Number:

CD#15

Tape Count: 10-12

SENTENCE, JUDGMENT and COMMITMENT
The defendant admits the following numbered allegations as stated
in the Affidavit and Order to Show Cause: 1
The defendant's probation is revoked.
The defendant's probation is reinstated for 36 months beginning
April 25, 2005.
Defendant transported for an OSC. Court orders defendant serve 3 65
days jail. No Credit Time Served. Upon release, all conditions of
probation to remain.
Court will consider an early release should defendant complete
CATS.
04-25-05 Tracking started for Probation. Review date Apr 25, 2 008.
02-15-06 Filed: AP&P Progress/Violation Report - Defendant non
compliant, request a $50,000 no-bail warrant be issued and an
OSC be set.
02-15-06 Filed: Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause
02-16-06 Filed order: AP&P p/v report - Court orders a bench warrant .
Judge STEPHEN L HENRIOD
Signed February 10, 2006
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02-16-06 Filed order: Order Show Cause
Judge DENNIS M FUCHS
Signed February 10, 2006
02-16-06 Tracking ended for Probation.
02-16-06 Notice - WARRANT for Case 021910707 ID 6537145
02-16-06 Warrant ordered on: February 16, 2006 Warrant Num: 981164865
Bail Allowed

Bail amount:
50000.00
02-16-06 Warrant issued on: February 16, 2006 Warrant Num: 981164865
Bail Allowed
Bail amount:
50000.00
Judge: DENNIS M FUCHS
Issue reason: Failure to Comply with Probation
04-05-06 Warrant recalled on: April 05, 2006 Warrant num: 981164865
Recall reason: Warrant recalled because defendant was
booked.
04-05-06 Note: Case referred to Judge Fuchs - Deft booked in ADC.
04-05-06 BENCH WARRANT HRG scheduled on April 12, 2006 at 08:30 AM in
Fourth Floor - W45 with Judge FUCHS.
04-06-06 Filed: AP&P Progress/Violation Report - Updated Information as
of April 5, 2006 - request OSC be held.
04-07-06 Filed order: AP&P p/v report - Court grants OSC.
Judge DENNIS M FUCHS
Signed April 06, 2006
04-12-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for Bench Warrant Hrg
Judge:
DENNIS M FUCHS
PRESENT
Clerk:
wendypg
Defendant
Video
Tape Number:

CD 3 5

Tape Count: 9-10-36

HEARING
Defendant transported for a bench warrant hearing. Court sets
this over for an Order to Show Cause on the following date:
(counsel, K. Stam, notified)
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE is scheduled.
Date: 04/24/2006
Time: 08:30 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - W4 5
Third District Court
450 South State
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: DENNIS M FUCHS
04-12-06 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE scheduled on April 24, 2006 at 08:30 AM in
Fourth Floor - W45 with Judge FUCHS.
04-24-06 Minute Entry - Post Sentencing
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Judge:
DENNIS M FUCHS
PRESENT
Clerk:
wendypg
Prosecutor: SHUMAN, JON D
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): STAM, KAREN J
Video

Tape Number:

CD 3 8

Tape Count: 9-09-41

SENTENCE, JUDGMENT and COMMITMENT
The defendant admits the following numbered allegations as stated
in the Affidavit and Order to Show Cause: 6,13,14
The following numbered allegations are dismissed as stated in the
affidavit and Order to Show Cause: remaining

The defendant's probation is terminated unsuccessfully.
Defendant transported for an OSC. Court imposes original sentence
of 1-15 at USP. Both counts to run Consecutive with Credit for
Time Served. All fines/fees to be referred to the Board of
Pardons.
04-24-06 Case Closed
Disposition Judge is DENNIS M FUCHS
01-01-07 Judge RANDALL SKANCHY assigned.
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